In this interview, Yeni Wong, chairperson of the Institute
for Taiwan-America Studies (ITAS), discusses Taiwan’s role in the world and the
Asia Pacific and its relations with the United States and China. The interview
was carried out on May 24, 2016, at ITAS headquarters in Washington, DC. The
following is a transcript of the interview, which has been edited for content,
length, and clarity.
From your own perspective, why is the 1992 Consensus the key to progress
in cross-strait relations?
Let me start with what’s been going on over the past eight
years in the Taiwan Strait. As part of the East Asian geopolitical sphere for
the past eight years, Taiwan has always acted in a spirit of reconciliation,
peace, and cooperation and tried to play the role of a peacemaker and
responsible stakeholder. It has promoted a mainland policy whose central tenets
are peace and prosperity while developing mutually beneficial cross-strait
relations. As a result, since the two sides came under separate rule sixty-six
years ago, the cross-strait status quo has never been more stable, which has
contributed to regional security and global peace.
The peace and stability that reign in the Taiwan Strait
today didn’t just fall from the sky. Looking back over the past seven years, it’s
clear that based on the 1992 Consensus—whereby each side acknowledges the
existence of “one China” but maintains its own interpretation of what that
means—the two sides have been moving forward on the path of peace through
positive interaction.
The 1992 Consensus and “one China with respective
interpretations” are based on the ROC constitution. So for Taiwan, of course
“one China” means the Republic of China. It cannot be interpreted as “two
Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “Taiwan independence,” all of which are
impermissible under the Taiwanese constitution. The “one China with respective
interpretations” concept thus reflects the cross-strait status quo and provides
mutual nonrecognition of sovereignty and mutual nondenial of governing
authority, which, in turn, underscores ROC sovereignty and respect for Taiwan.
It also constitutes the foundation of trust upon which the current cross-strait
consensus was built.
The 1992 Consensus is certainly not a panacea that
resolves all cross-strait problems. But the practical experience derived from
the peaceful development of cross-strait relations since 2008 confirms that the
1992 Consensus is workable and inclusive, with viable game rules.
What I want to emphasize is this: the 1992 Consensus is a
critically important consensus that has been recognized, and agreed to, by the
respective parties. The 1992 Consensus, whereby each side acknowledges the
existence of “one China” but maintains its own interpretation of what that
means, has allowed the ROC and mainland China to pull back from the brink of
war and move toward cooperative engagement; it transformed potential volatility
into peace and prosperity. And at its very core, the 1992 Consensus is a
commitment to upholding the ROC sovereignty.
It’s undeniable that some people in Taiwanese society see
the 1992 Consensus differently. Other people have proposed other initiatives,
hoping to establish a new basis for cross-strait interaction. But after these
initiative were explained in Taiwan, and in the course of cross-strait
interactions, none of those initiatives have been able to win the approval and
trust of the relevant stakeholders in Taiwanese society, mainland China, or the
region. So to date, the 1992 Consensus has still received the most support.
Public opinion polls conducted in November of 2014 and May of 2015 show public
support for “one China, respective interpretations” at 53 percent if “one
China” means the ROC.
Actually, it’s clear from the development of cross-strait
relations over the past twenty-three years that the 1992 Consensus is the key
to progress in cross-strait relations. When Taipei and Beijing abide by that consensus,
cross-strait relations flourish. If they diverge from it, cross-strait
relations will deteriorate. And if Taipei opposes it, there will be turmoil in
the Taiwan Strait. I’m convinced that the key to maintaining cross-strait peace
and stability in the future lies in abiding by the 1992 Consensus: one China, respective
interpretations.
So in the future, no matter who holds the reins of
government, Taipei must continue to consolidate this path. That is the only way
to maintain cross-strait peace and stability. It is true that the 1992
Consensus has been criticized as an ambiguous concept. Some even call it “a
masterpiece of ambiguity.” But so what? What matters is that it works and works
well.
What are the greatest threats to the cross-strait and Asia
Pacific security?
From my personal perspective, it’s Taiwan’s restricted
international space. Today, only twenty-two countries in the world
diplomatically recognize Taiwan. Taiwan is not a UN member nor a member of most
international governmental organizations. Especially as the chairperson of the
Institute for Taiwan-America Studies (ITAS), this is my number-one concern.
Taiwan, however, has done a lot of things to try to make
it up, and the fact that the cross-strait relationship has improved in recent
years has made the enlargement of Taiwan international space somewhat easier,
but a lot of things remain to be achieved, and the issue has two sides. I
usually say that it’s not only that Taiwan needs the UN and the UN specialized
agencies, but they also need Taiwan to make the UN system global. In this
regard, I’m very grateful for American assistance because, in a way, when these
UN agencies close their doors to Taiwan, the United States helps us to open a
window.
Just as much as Taiwan needs UN agencies, these agencies
also need Taiwan. For example, the WHO [World Health Organization] already has
made some improvements. Since 2009, Taiwan has been able to go to the WHA
meetings every year. But as you know, the WHA—the World Health Assembly—only
lasts for eight days a year. The rest of the time, Taiwan still has a lot of
difficulties in participating in the organization’s professional activities.
As for other efforts to expand Taiwan’s international
space, I can give you a long list of examples. The US House of Representatives
just adopted a resolution aimed at helping Taiwan get into Interpol, the
international police organization. The reason is very simple: Taiwan needs to
get access to Interpol’s resources and information, and Interpol needs Taiwan’s
assistance, especially because Taiwan is an international air hub. It is in
neither Taiwan’s nor the rest of the world’s interest to make Taiwan a gap in
the global system of crime prevention and antiterrorism. I am grateful that the
US Congress is now trying to help Taiwan.
Taiwan is too big to ignore. There is also ICAO, for
example, the International Civil Aviation Organization. Taiwan is trying to
knock at its door. As I said, Taiwan is an air hub. Every week, there are 541
direct flights between Taiwan and the United States. And in the Taipei flight information
region (FIR), which is the airspace under Taipei air traffic control, every
year Taipei serves from 1.2 million up to 1.8 million flights, most of them
international flights. Not being a member of ICAO, Taipei sometimes doesn’t
have access to even its technical information. If there’s any change in the
international air traffic rules, how could Taiwan get to know those changes?
How does Taiwan adjust its own operations accordingly?
So this should be an international concern, not just
Taiwan’s. In this regard, ICAO should be grateful to Taiwan as well because
even without membership or observer status, Taipei has made a lot of efforts to
get the right operational manuals, trying to keep Taiwanese airlines up to
international standards and regulations, and so on. The ICAO, however, still
refuses to include Taiwan in some technical meetings—I am talking about
technical meetings, not political meetings. Technical meetings are very
important for the technicians and professionals to understand why such
regulations are made. Taiwan needs to synchronize with the developments in the
rest of the world.
This is why the ITAS is focused on studies of Taiwan’s
quest for greater participation in the international community. It also carries
research projects on issues that interest both Taiwan and the United States.
There are so many international meetings that make new regulations and
resolutions. As a modern country, you have to keep yourself updated with
international standards all the time. But Taiwan doesn’t have that kind of
access. So there’s nothing political about this concern of the ITAS.
What can be done to address this concern? Does the improvement in
cross-strait ties help expand Taiwan’s international space?
Peace is the foundation for Taiwan’s democratic system,
and I would like to stress the importance of peace across the Taiwan Strait and
in its democracy. Peace is also the foundation of the democratic system in
today’s Taiwan. If there’s no cross-strait peace, that will pose a threat to
the development of freedom and democracy.
Before the late ’80s, Taiwan imposed martial law and
experienced the “White Terror,” a period of suppression of political
dissidents, which Washington described as the result of war between the
Kuomintang and Chinese Communist forces. Thus, cross-strait rapprochement and
cooperation have been a top priority for President Ma’s administration since he
took office in May 2008, and such an approach is helpful in the development of
democracy and freedom.
Since he took office, he has been making efforts to
promote cross-strait peace based on the 1992 Consensus and the principles of
“no unification, no independence, and no use of force.”
Since 2008, both sides of the strait have signed
twenty-three agreements covering a wide range of issues. Cross-strait relations
are also at their best in sixty-seven years, turning the Taiwan Strait from a
flash point to “an avenue of peace.”
In the global arena, the international community has
encouraged the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations, and
the world’s major nations have affirmed and supported cross-strait progress.
Former US President George W. Bush and his successor, President Barack Obama,
as well as key leaders throughout Europe, the Americas, and Asia, have all
encouraged Taiwan’s current mainland policy, acknowledging that peace in the
Taiwan Strait is the key to regional stability. That peace also allows
countries all over the world to have peaceful interactions with both sides of
the strait—an unprecedented development.
Furthermore, Taiwan has also been able to participate in
international organizations, attending the World Health Assembly (WHA) for six
consecutive years after a hiatus of thirty-eight years, and the Assembly of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in September 2014 after an
absence of forty-two years. These opportunities for participation are clearly a
positive spillover from the improvement in cross-strait relations and create a
virtuous cycle of meaningful participation in international society that
expands Taiwan’s international space.
And while cross-strait economic and trade cooperation have
continued to expand, Taiwan has also signed investment and fisheries agreements
with Japan and economic cooperation and economic partnership agreements with
New Zealand and Singapore. Those agreements have added momentum to domestic
economic development and Taiwan’s efforts to participate in regional
integration mechanisms such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The mutual trust accumulated over the past few years also
led to the historic meeting between Ma and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in
November in 2015 in Singapore, which was symbolic and helped build the
framework for sustainable cross-strait ties.
I would like to express my hope that such meetings between
top leaders from Taiwan and China will be continued in the future, serving as
an intangible bridge of peace across the strait. As Taiwan acts as a peacemaker
in the world, it can enjoy more respect and dignity.
You mentioned TPP. There is a growing trend toward
regional economic integration, whether through bilateral free-trade agreements
or multilateral arrangements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. What plans
do you have to try to help Taiwan join the process of economic integration?
The fellows and staff in ITAS have to make a special
effort on Capitol Hill and beyond. We have to try to convince every member of Congress
to help Taiwan.
People ask me about the factor of China. Indeed, this
certainly would make Taiwan’s TPP bid even more complicated or difficult. But
there have been a few precedents regarding the coexistence of both sides in the
same international organizations, even though not entirely to Taiwan’s
satisfaction. For example, look at Taipei’s experiences with WTO accession.
Taiwan waited for China for almost two years. Taiwan had already finished all
the negotiations, but China insisted that it had to get in first. I’d been told
that China would get in first and only after a coffee break would Taiwan get
in.
Why did Taiwan have to wait for China for two years?
Taiwan would have already finished all the negotiations at that time. So I hope
this time there will be no more unfair political restraints as such. This is
why I’m saying Taiwan’s international space is ITAS’s number-one concern.
Taiwan does not mind or fear competition on an equal footing, but Taiwan needs
to have an equal footing first. Taiwan only asks for fairness.
Taiwan is only one-third the size of the state of
Virginia, but Taiwan is the United States’ ninth-largest trading partner.
Taiwan is comparable to countries like India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and even
bigger ones such as Russia or Australia as a trading partner to the United
States. So the Taiwan story deserves US notice and support, or maybe even some
admiration. Even though Taiwan is a small and remote island seven thousand
miles away, Taiwan is a big player that nobody can ignore.
Taiwan’s government has proposed “peace initiatives” as a way of
dealing with territorial disputes in both the East and South China Seas. How
can Taiwan help defuse potential crises in these regions?
President Ma’s proposal in 2012 is called the East China
Sea Peace Initiative. And in May 2015, he also proposed the South China Sea
Peace Initiative. Basically, they are proposals asking the parties concerned to
set aside territorial disputes and instead concentrate on joint exploration or
cooperation on economic resources, because if you only concentrate on
sovereignty, you can never resolve the problems.
Take the East China Sea Peace Initiative, for example,
concerning the Diaoyutai Island—what the Japanese call the Senkakus. Taiwan
tried to negotiate with the Japanese for a fishery agreement to resolve or
defuse fishery disputes for seventeen years. Taiwan didn’t get too far until
April 2013. Finally, based on President Ma’s peace initiative, Taiwan and Japan
signed a fishery agreement. Altogether, Taiwan enlarged the fishing area up to seventy-four
thousand square kilometers to let Taiwanese fishermen fish freely within these
waters. Today, the fishermen can increase their fishing harvest, and there’s
been only one fishing incident in the two years since the agreement was signed.
Each side still retains its basic position of sovereign claims—nonetheless, the
fishing issues have been largely resolved.
So this is something Taiwan has been doing. Taiwan has
been able to apply this kind of practice to the South China Sea as well. Taiwan
and the Philippines just signed a similar kind of fishing agreement in last
November after negotiations over the past two years. This agreement also
reflects the spirit and principles of the South China Sea Peace Initiative.
I would also like to take this opportunity to express
Taiwan’s position on a unilateral plea filed by a claimant in the South China
Sea dispute for international arbitration. It is extremely unfair for Taiwan
because its voice cannot be heard, and its intention to send observers was
rejected, but it involves one of the islands under Taiwanese sovereignty and
effective control for more than six decades—Taiping Island (Itu Aba).
To my surprise, the lead legal counsel for the applicant
country recently made several factual errors when interviewed by a think tank
here in Washington, DC. He first said that Taiping Island does not have fresh
water, implying it cannot sustain human habitation. But the fact remains that
the island has four wells, which can produce about sixty-five metric tons of
fresh water daily for drinking and cooking needs. The purity percentage of this
water can reach 99 percent.
The legal counsel also said that Taiping Island has no
soil to grow vegetables or other agricultural production, so it is incapable of
sustaining human habitation and has to be “completely” supplied by outside
sources. Yet Taiwan’s minister of the interior just visited the island with a
group of officials, and they had a nice lunch, including chicken, loofah
gourds, bitter melons, etc., all locally raised or grown—that is the best
rebuttal.
So I have to reiterate point eight of Taiwan’s statement
issued on July 7, 2015, concerning this international arbitration: “Any
arrangement or agreement regarding Taiping Island (Itu Aba) or other islands in
the South China Sea and their surrounding waters that is reached without ROC
participation and consent shall have no legal effect on the ROC and shall not
be recognized by the ROC government.”
Let me also emphasize that Taiping Island is the largest
of the naturally formed islands in the Spratly group. Taiwan would like to
build the island into a showcase in the spirit of the South China Sea Peace
Initiative—that is, a peaceful and low-carbon island as well as an ecological
reserve, capable of not only sustaining human habitation but also offering
humanitarian assistance to those nearby or passing through the region.
As the United States continues its “rebalance to Asia,”
what areas have the potential for closer cooperation between Taipei and
Washington?
I usually ask my friends in Washington, DC, why should
they support Taiwan? Number one, very simply: Taiwan is the only democracy in
the Chinese-speaking world. Also, for every five dollars of US global trade,
approximately five dollars is today done with the Chinese-speaking world—with
China, the largest trading partner; with Taiwan, ninth largest; with Singapore,
Hong Kong, Macau, etc. Very soon, probably one out of four dollars of trade
will be done with the Chinese-speaking world, and Taiwan is the only democracy.
In this regard, Taiwan is probably the role model for the people in Hong Kong
and the envy of the younger generation in China.
And another reason: Taiwan offers strategic assets to
Americans. Taiwan is probably the single largest external source of investment
in China. China doesn’t call Taiwanese investors “foreign investors” but
“external investors.” I can give you many examples. A Taiwanese company called
Foxconn has created over one million jobs in China. A Taiwanese investor owns
the number-one brand name of instant noodles in China. So Taiwan is the largest
single external source of investment in China.
Taiwan is also the single largest external source of
knowledge about China. The Taiwanese know China better than anybody else—the
history, the language, the culture, and the current situation. For example,
look at the historical archives in Taiwan. The best portion of the original art
collection of Beijing’s Forbidden City is in today’s Taipei. The Chiang
Kai-Shek government moved 609,000 pieces of artifacts from the Forbidden City’s
collection to Taiwan in 1949. Today, Taiwan opens them up to Chinese tourists.
They openly thank Taiwan, saying that if Taiwan had let them stay behind,
probably most of them would have been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution.
The same can be said of the diplomatic archives of modern China, including the
original copies of most of the so-called unequal treaties of the late Ch’ing
period in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
And Taiwan is also the single largest external source of
influence over China. Today, Taiwan is hosting more than thirty-three thousand
Chinese students. When Taiwan has elections, you see the people in China,
especially the younger generation, also get excited. Taiwanese democracy has
become the envy of a lot of people in China, and people-to-people exchanges
between the two sides are so extensive and intensive that there have been,
according to one statistic, more than 280,000 intermarriages so far.
So social, economic, and cultural integration between the
two sides of the Taiwan Strait has already started and is moving very fast,
whether you like it or not, no matter which political stand you take.
Some analysts believe China is creating a new network of
regional institutions to rival and perhaps even replace the current US-led
alternatives. How does Washington interpret Beijing’s new initiatives? Can the
United States and China avoid a strategic competition for regional leadership?
As President Obama has emphasized, a stable, prosperous
China that contributes to the international financial system is in America’s
interest. China’s progress benefits our own and vice versa.
I think the issue of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) has been formulated as a sort of zero-sum tug-of-war. That’s
unfortunate because the reality is very different. Over the last two years or
so, China and the prospective members of the AIIB have said that they want the
AIIB to adopt sound governance practices and the environmental and social
safeguards of the existing multilateral development banks (MDBs). The US hope is
that this will lead to concrete commitments enshrined in the AIIB’s founding
documents.
So, in short, the United States supports China playing a
constructive role in regional and global affairs—and the United States is
working with China to help it do just that. Around the world, the United States
is cooperating with China on important issues such as piracy, peacekeeping,
pandemic disease, and climate change; and the United States will continue to do
so. Washington will build on these areas of cooperation, even as the United
States works to constructively manage our differences. The United States
believes that provides the best path to developing a productive relationship
with China.