The following interview with Yeni Wong, chairperson of the
Institute for Taiwan-America Studies, was carried out on April 30, 2016, at
ITAS headquarters in Washington, DC. The two main topics of the interview were
the South China Sea and the relationship of the United States to Asia.
Following is a summary of the interview:
How dangerous is the Taiwan issue? How important is the Taiwan Strait? How dangerous is the Taiwan Strait
area?
I would say that there are many
factors associated with the Taiwan Strait that make it quite dangerous.
Probably the most important factor is that you have forces at work that appear
to be almost inexorable.
Over the last several years,
[there has been] a sort of really determined Chinese military buildup aimed at
Taiwan that neither scolding from Western diplomats nor appeals to China’s own
self-interest had any success in blunting or lessening. At the same time, there
is an inexorable process in Taiwan of greater democratization, with the people seeing
themselves as more Taiwanese than Chinese. And perhaps most importantly, there
is a lack of clarity in the United States about what precisely our strategic
interests are and perhaps more importantly, how to achieve them.
Preventing Taiwan from going independent is also
absolutely critical to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime. Chinese
leaders believe that if they were to let Taiwan go independent and not respond,
they would probably be overthrown by their own nationalistic people. Therefore,
I think they would be willing to engage in what we might call “self-defeating
military adventures” in order to prevent that result, even if they knew they
were going to lose.
So in my view, the key problem for the United States is
how to deter the PRC from using force against Taiwan. We have to be very clear
about that because I think the United States would intervene if force were used
under most circumstances I can imagine. But on the other hand, we have to deter
Taiwan from engaging in such risky behavior that they precipitate an attack
that will be destabilizing to Asia, destroy Taiwan’s economy, and drag the
United States into a regional conflict.
So it is a potential flash point? And that is also potentially
severe for America?
Yes, it’s undoubtedly a potential flash point. The
interesting thing about the world today is that every major challenge to peace
and stability that has the potential to erupt on a global scale is found in
Asia. Tents still stand on the Korean peninsula, there is an increasingly
delicate and complicated relationship across the Taiwan Strait, and there is a
nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. The Taiwan Strait issue is most
complicated because the United States does not have a firm and clear role in
terms of what it would do in a military crisis.
Of all the conflicts in the world, how do you rate the Taiwan
Strait as a potential flash point?
I would say it’s probably the most dangerous flash point
in the entire world because once a war erupts there, many countries are going
to be drawn in. The United States is probably not going to sit idle. Japan and
other countries in the area might have to react because the Taiwan Strait
happens to be a very important sea-link communication channel. The channel
cannot afford to be shut down. So many countries will be drawn into the
situation.
Does America have an obligation to defend Taiwan if it’s attacked?
The United States no longer has a treaty obligation to
come to the defense of Taiwan. What Washington has is the Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979. This obligates the United States to sell weapons of a defensive
character to Taiwan. It obligates the United States to be concerned about the
situation in Taiwan and the region, and it obligates the president of the
United States to consult with Congress about what to do. So, in a sense,
Washington is obligated to be concerned and give Taiwan the means by which it
can defend itself, but the United States is not obligated to come to the direct
rescue.
My next question is a general one: What’s Taiwan’s
evolving position in the South China Sea?
The South China Sea matter is becoming increasingly
complex. The Philippines has presented a challenge with its demand for
international arbitration. This is a matter of national territory and national
sovereignty. Taiwan is one of the claimant countries in the South China Sea
sovereignty dispute. But Taiwan has no voice during international negotiations.
Taiwan has no seat at the negotiating table. Taiwan must make itself visible
however it can. Only then can Taiwan avoid being sidelined and sacrificed. This
is why Taiwan invited multiple international media outlets to visit the Itu Aba
Island, also known as Taiping Island, in January 2016.
The island has around two hundred residents, the majority
of which are coast guard personnel. Inhabitants grow crops of fruits and
vegetables, and the tap water is reportedly potable. Taiping Island is indeed
an island, not a rock. The tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague, and the Philippine government and its lawyers, should understand
that Taiping Island fully meets the definition of an island as laid out in
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
namely, that it can sustain human habitation and has an economic life of its
own. Therefore, in addition to twelve nautical miles of territorial waters,
Taiwan is entitled to claim a two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone
and a continental shelf.
Whether at present or in the past, Taiping Island has long
sustained human habitation and economic activity. The China Sea Directory, published in 1879 by the British
Admiralty’s Hydrographic Office, records that early Chinese fishermen were seen
at Taiping Island collecting sea cucumber and trading in turtle shells. As the
twentieth century opened, the Japanese landed on the island to mine sulfur and
build a seafood cannery. Today, a plaque left by the Japanese company still
stands. In 1946, when Taiwan regained control over Taiping Island, the remains
of an ancient temple were found there. Taiwanese government personnel have been
stationed on the island continuously since 1956. These facts serve to show that
Taiping Island is indeed suitable for human habitation and can sustain economic
life of its own.
The Philippines has not explored the history and geography
of Taiping Island in depth, let alone sent officials to personally set foot on
the island to explore its environment. The Philippines should send representatives
or their lawyers on a tour of Taiping Island. The five tribunal judges should
also make a site visit so that they may see for themselves whether Taiping
Island is an island that has fresh water, can produce crops and raise chickens
and goats, and can sustain human life and economic activity. The goal of Taiwan
management of Taiping Island is to transform it into an island for peace and
rescue operations as well as an ecologically friendly and low-carbon island.
Taipei has no military purpose there—as early as 2000, the government of Taiwan
replaced the marines with coast guard personnel—have not engaged in land
reclamation, and have not built new facilities beyond renovating existing ones.
The International Court of Arbitration is likely to render
just such a judgment between March and June 2016, precisely during the handover
of power in Taipei. Taiwanese President Ma Ying-Jeou chose to visit Taiping
Island in late January and flew international media to Taiping Island to show
the world that the island is large enough to be habitable and has been Taiwan’s
for a very long time. The Philippines’ demand for arbitration is disingenuous.
The Taiwan experience on Taiping Island, then, can be said to be a model for
the South China Sea—well worth the attention of the United States and the
international community.
Do you see the United States as a Pacific nation?
Absolutely. The United States has always been a Pacific
nation. With Guam and Hawaii, the United States has territory in the Pacific.
So Americans think of the United States as a Pacific nation, and Washington
believes that the United States has very important interests in the Pacific. I
don’t see a debate in whether the United States should withdraw from the
region. So maybe this will come sometime in the indeterminate future. But I
think that there is a common agreement that the United States is a Pacific
nation.
Do you see the risk of a conflict between China and the
United States?
I have no doubt those Sino-US
relations have had their ups and downs in recent years. They
include clashes over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and net security.
And the recent South China Sea disputes have nearly led to military conflict.
The US Department of Defense recently accused China of
land reclamation in South China Sea islands and reefs. Citing “freedom of
navigation,” the US military may dispatch military aircraft and warships to
within twelve nautical miles of the disputed reefs. Under the United Nations
Convention, territorial waters extend twelve nautical miles from the coast. If
the US military enters this zone, it will violate China’s territorial
sovereignty, and its action will amount to a military provocation.
In early 2016, Beijing’s foreign minister, Guo Chuhua,
urged Washington to treat the South China Sea issue with caution. He declared
support for freedom of navigation within the South China Sea, but not within
China’s territorial waters and airspace. There, China will firmly safeguard its
territorial sovereignty. The US State Department is playing good cop. It
emphasizes that the United States’ first choice is diplomatic negotiations.
Secretary of State Kerry visited Beijing in early 2016. The ostensible reason
was to make arrangements for the annual US-China Strategic Dialogue to be held
in Washington in June 2016. In reality, he was there to communicate the US
position.
The United States has been considering military deterrence
in response to the South China Sea dispute for some time. As early as 2010,
when Hillary Clinton was secretary of state, the South China Sea was defined as
a vital national interest of the United States. Indications were that
Washington might resort to military intervention.
In July 2015, during the sixth Sino-US strategic dialogue,
the United States proposed that the South China Sea situation be “frozen.” The
parties would no longer seize reefs, the South China Sea landscape would not
change, and no one would take unilateral action. In August, it proposed that
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meet and
voluntarily freeze the South China Sea situation, giving priority to a
political solution before a military one.
The parties involved were unenthusiastic. Beijing
subsequently proposed a “two-track approach,” in which the disputants would
engage in peaceful negotiations followed by South China Sea maintenance of the
peace by China and ASEAN members. This, too, failed to receive a positive
response from Washington.
The Obama government is mired in both domestic and
diplomatic difficulties. At a time like this, the United States does not want
military conflict with China. The Pentagon is now threatening force to deter
Mainland China. This is the result of three considerations. First, anti-China
political sentiment in on the rise in Washington. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Bob Corker recently applied pressure on Obama, demanding US
military action in the East China Sea. Second, Japan, the Philippines, and
other Asia Pacific allies are demonstrating greater leadership compared to the
past. Third, military intimidation may hinder Beijing’s one-belt, one-road
maritime Silk Road building process, delaying the pace of China’s military
rise.
Originally, the United States had no intention of
intervening in East China Sea and South China Sea territorial disputes. It only
emphasized freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Beijing
has reiterated that the facilities on the South China Sea islands and reefs are
for meteorological research, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. They
will not affect freedom of navigation. The problem is that Washington has never
acknowledged Beijing’s “never hegemony, never seek hegemony”; the declaration
of the recent US military layout in the South China Sea is the “freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea” as an excuse.
If the United States refuses to change its attitude
regarding Mainland China’s rise, China and the United States will not be able
to resolve their structural differences, let alone establish political trust.
Washington cannot stop Mainland China’s military rise. China is not about to
change its position on South China Sea territorial sovereignty. Instead of
military containment, the United States should promote strategic cooperation
with mainland China. Fear and suspicion will only increase the risk of Chinese-US
conflict and friction.
Secretary of State Kerry’s recent high-profile visit to
Moscow did little to improve US-Russian relations. His visit to Beijing may not
yield any concrete results either. If Washington thinks that military pressure
against Beijing is a bargaining chip, it has misjudged the situation. If the
two sides clash, the impact on stability and prosperity in the Asia Pacific
region will be serious. America prides itself on leading the Asia Pacific
countries. It must be prudent.
For Taiwan, the less stable relations are between Beijing
and Washington, the greater the risk to relations across the strait.
Unfortunately, Taiwan’s partisan political struggles are fierce. Taiwan’s new president,
Tsai Ing-Wen, needs to fashion a pragmatic diplomatic identity because it is a
tricky road ahead for her government. When Beijing and Washington clash, Taipei
often finds itself the object of reproach. There is no trust between the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and China whatsoever. Therefore, it must be
especially cautious.
There are some think tanks in the United States that argue
that the United States should contain China. How far do you agree or disagree
with this statement?
The rise of China is a fait
accompli. To suggest that the United States should contain China and, if
necessary, go to war is, in the words of former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, “as dangerous as it is wrong.” It makes even less sense when the
United States is borrowing money from China, in the form of treasuries, to
finance that possible conflict. Containment is a policy with numerous
contextual elements that cannot simply be transferred from the Soviet era. The
United States’ attempts to contain China may make it a self-fulfilling
prophecy. China is not the new Soviet Union.
In time, China’s peaceful rise will show its true colors.
It is not clear whether China’s current behavior is a product of regional
hegemonic aspirations or simply a manifestation of its internal contradictions,
factions, and rivalry in the one-party system. The question of who can contain
China is one that only the Chinese can answer for themselves. In the meantime,
the United States needs to remain vigilant and engage.
In the end, China has to capitalize on its soft power,
with its Confucian ethics and cultural heritage from which America’s Founding
Fathers once sought inspiration. Beijing should promote peaceful relations with
its neighbors, influence potential allies, and return to its official policy of
a peaceful rise with clarity in words and consistency in actions. That’s
quintessentially “living in harmony” with the Tao—the Chinese way. So the
United States just has to keep at it. The Chinese are not going to change their
behavior for the United States. They have to be convinced that it serves their
interest. Sometimes they agree, sometimes they don’t.
What should we expect from the US strategic rebalance to the Asia Pacific
region? What are the prospects for economic reform in China? Are new strategic
alignments emerging in the Asia Pacific as the United States focuses on crises
elsewhere?
Few US national security officials pay much attention to
the implications of Taiwan’s economic predicament for US security in general.
But they should. President Obama’s recent visit to Asia was fraught with
strategic implications. In a region where economics is synonymous with
security, the impact of Taiwan’s exclusion from the regional trade blocs is
politically significant trade marginalization that may change the course of
tomorrow’s security framework.
Taiwan has historically played an important role as an
ally of the United States and has significant importance as a security factor
in relations between Washington and Beijing and other nations in the Asia Pacific
region. Arms sales help secure Taiwan’s democracy, which will be of even
greater strategic importance to the United States as Washington proceeds with
its pivot to Asia. However, in the absence of international participation, the
growth of Taiwan’s marginalization is the unfortunate consequence.
The United States’ commitment to building an ambitious,
comprehensive, and high-quality Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is largely
welcomed by the Asian community. Although the negotiations on an Asia Pacific
trade deal still have a long way to go, however, analysts mostly agree that a
regional free-trade agreement without Taiwan would be unthinkable and would
render the regional integration incomplete and ineffective to the disadvantage
of American interest.
Taiwan is a central geographic hub for the Asia Pacific
region and a leading supplier of intermediate goods and components to Asia Pacific
supply chains, from high-end electronics contract manufacturing to leading-edge
performance fabrics. US companies partner closely with Taiwanese firms, relying
on them to use the region’s supply chains to deliver products on schedule and
efficiently. Taiwan’s participation in TPP will assist the island’s
competitiveness and overcome Taiwan’s possible economic isolation. More than
one-third of Taiwan’s trade is with the twelve current TPP members. Taiwan is
too important to the global economy and to the prosperity of the Asia Pacific
region to be left out of this vital trade agreement.
Taipei is seeking support from Washington for Taiwan’s TPP
access, as the United States is a key negotiating member of this trade bloc.
Taiwan is critical to the United States not only for its location but also for
its shared values and its position as a key trading partner. Taiwan is
currently the United States’ ninth-largest trading partner, ahead of Saudi
Arabia, India, and Brazil.
Taiwan is a dynamic and longtime US ally devoted to
regional peace and stability, and its inclusion in TPP strengthens US ties with
another like-minded economy in Asia. Taiwan is also too important to the global
economy and to the prosperity of the Asia Pacific region to be left out of this
vital trade agreement. It makes sense to include one of the United States’
strongest democratic allies in East Asia in the next round of negotiations and
to use the tool of regional integration to benefit both the US and Taiwanese
economies.
When you look at cross-strait relations today, what do you think
of Beijing’s attempts to pressure the island’s new president already?
While attempting to realize the Chinese dream, Beijing
must consider the Taiwan issue from a global perspective. Mainland China must
be committed to maintaining peace and stability in the region and reducing
conflict in the strait. This will improve the political atmosphere in the
entire region and beyond.
When Beijing is faced with obstinacy from the Tsai regime,
applying pressure must not be its sole response. Beijing must address
twenty-three million people in Taiwan, not just the DPP government, which will
only be in office temporarily. In order to avoid a backlash, Beijing must
consider the public reaction when dealing with the island’s new president.
Taiwan has a democratic and pluralistic society, and the ruling party does not
represent the whole of Taiwan. Beijing must see the larger strategic picture.
Beijing should attempt to win hearts and minds and let Taiwanese values fulfill
the Chinese dream.
So in the world of real politics, what if Taiwan’s new president
wants to revitalize the economy and doesn’t expect much help from China?
Tsai Ing-Wen is clearly intent on “de-Sinicizing” Taiwan.
But the global economy has taken a downturn, and Taiwan must upgrade its
economy. This puts the new regime under enormous pressure. In her inaugural
speech, Tsai refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Therefore, cross-strait
relations will not be what they have been for the last eight years.
Cross-strait economic and trade exchanges beneficial to both sides, or even to
Taiwan alone, will be reduced. Any economic policy that attempts to de-Sinicize
Taiwan will be subject to close scrutiny. If the economy remains in the
doldrums two years from May 2016, Tsai’s regime will be judged and will be
asked to step down.
Do you believe that it is in the United States’ interest to
strengthen ties with Taiwan militarily, economically, and diplomatically?
Thirty-seven years ago, the US Congress passed the Taiwan
Relations Act and began more than three decades of support for Taiwan. Taiwan’s
value and achievements have special historical factors. The US factor is
particularly important.
Taiwan has a lot to offer in the way of capacity,
expertise, and resources, and that is why Washington must continue to elevate
Taiwan’s international profile and dignity. As a dynamic and longtime US ally
devoted to regional peace and stability, Taiwan can be an important friend in
helping solve pressing global and regional challenges.
The United States should not abandon Taiwan, nor should it
force Taiwan to become America’s strategic pawn and China’s enemy. The United
States should accept the rise of China. It should allow Taiwan to become a
buffer in relations between China and the United States, enabling the two to
work together to maintain world order and prosperity.